Using ICAF to create sustainable stability in Iraq An article over at Small Wars Journal, Preventing OIF III: Using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework to Achieve a Sustainable Iraqi Security Force, tackles the tough issue of the long game in Iraq: preventing continued civil war after the fall of ISIS. Authors Christina Bembenek, Darrel Choat, Randy
Unconventional Warfare Fundamentals
“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires — in those situations where we must encounter it
Iran’s Unconventional Warfare in Yemen
An article by our editor on Iranian unconventional warfare in Yemen appeared this morning on Small Wars Journal. Written from the Iranian point of view, the article analyzes the Iranian conduct of unconventional warfare in Yemen, and addresses the feasibility of the operation, suitability to the strategic position of Iran, and acceptability of likely costs.
Doing What You Know: The United States and 250 Years of Irregular War – Lessons from History about Confronting Irregular Adversaries
A new study has been released by CSBA, “Doing What You Know: The United States and 250 Years of Irregular War,” which looks at the US’s history in confronting irregular adversaries over the last 250 years, with recommendations for the future. Because COIN is hard and messy, our natural temptation is to pivot away quickly and
Trump ends CIA support to Syrian Rebels – “Putin won in Syria”
The Washington Post reports that President Trump has decided to end the CIA’s covert program to arm and train moderate Syrian rebels battling the government of Bashar al-Assad, a move likely to empower more radical groups inside Syria and damage the credibility of the United States. WAPO quotes an anonymous current official as saying “This is a
Understanding Worley’s “United States Political Warfare Policy”
In January 2015, strategic advisor and military force structure analyst Dr. D. Robert Worley released a draft think piece that delves into how the United States should engage in political warfare in order to successfully ensure stability of countries experiencing subversion. The piece can generally be described as a blueprint for problem solving, providing background
The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea.
A very interesting article was just published by the Middle East Studies program at Marine Corps University, entitled “The Jihadist Maritime Strategy: Waging a Guerrilla War at Sea.” In it, Dr. Norman Cigar reviews the often neglected maritime component of terrorism, with particular attention to al Qaeda and related organizations. You can find a copy of
The Lingering Effects of Concrete Barriers in COIN
In counterinsurgency operations, tactical successes can often lead to strategic failure. Thus the oft-repeated admonishment to consider second and third order effects. One of the reasons for this paradox is the prolonged time-horizons inherent in counterinsurgency, as is aptly demonstrated in an article published by West Point’s Modern War Institute about the use of concrete
Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare: A Missed Opportunity for Counterinsurgency Doctrine?
A recent article by Nathaniel Moir in the Small Wars Journal is well worth the read. In it, he argues that “the legacy of the United States’ Counterinsurgency doctrine includes a contentious foundation” and that the work of Bernard Fall “provided a more circumspect corpus of work from which the United States’ Counterinsurgency doctrine may
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
The most iconic form of irregular warfare is that of insurgency (not to be confused with guerilla warfare), and its necessary counterpart, counterinsurgency. COIN, as it is often referred to, is even more iconic of IW than many imagine, since counterinsurgency campaigns often take on the superficial guise of counterterrorism for political purposes. However, in