Using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework to Create a Stable Security Environment in Iraq

Using ICAF to create sustainable stability in Iraq An article over at Small Wars Journal, Preventing OIF III: Using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework to Achieve a Sustainable Iraqi Security Force, tackles the tough issue of the long game in Iraq: preventing continued civil war after the fall of ISIS. Authors Christina Bembenek, Darrel Choat, Randy […]

Unconventional Warfare Fundamentals

“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires — in those situations where we must encounter it […]

Iran’s Unconventional Warfare in Yemen

An article by our editor on Iranian unconventional warfare in Yemen  appeared this morning on Small Wars Journal. Written from the Iranian point of view, the article analyzes the Iranian conduct of unconventional warfare in Yemen, and addresses the feasibility of the operation, suitability to the strategic position of Iran, and acceptability of likely costs. […]

Understanding Worley’s “United States Political Warfare Policy”

By Marissa Soltoff In January 2015, strategic advisor and military force structure analyst Dr. D. Robert Worley released a draft think piece that delves into how the United States should engage in political warfare in order to successfully ensure stability of countries experiencing subversion. The piece can generally be described as a blueprint for problem […]

The Lingering Effects of Concrete Barriers in COIN

In counterinsurgency operations, tactical successes can often lead to strategic failure. Thus the oft-repeated admonishment to consider second and third order effects. And one of the reasons for this paradox is the prolonged time-horizons inherent in counterinsurgency, as is aptly demonstrated in an article published by West Point’s Modern War Institute: The concrete barriers emplaced […]

Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare: A Missed Opportunity for Counterinsurgency Doctrine?

A recent article by Nathaniel Moir in the Small Wars Journal is well worth the read. In it, he argues that “the legacy of the United States’ Counterinsurgency doctrine includes a contentious foundation” and that the work of Bernard Fall “provided a more circumspect corpus of work from which the United States’ Counterinsurgency doctrine may […]